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Sotiraki et al. proposed Dinocchio, the first distributed SNARK for ring arithmetic, achieving constant proof size and verification time with significant prover speedup. Sotiraki等人在论文中提出了首个针对环算术的分布式SNARK系统Dinocchio，实现常数级证明大小和验证时间，显著提升证明效率。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Existing SNARKs are optimized for finite fields, incurring high overhead for ring arithmetic (e.g., lattice-based crypto and FHE). 现有SNARK主要针对有限域算术，环算术（如格密码和FHE）应用时开销大
- • Dinocchio is the first distributed SNARK for rings with constant proof size and verification time. Dinocchio是首个针对环算术的分布式SNARK，证明大小和验证时间均为常数
- • Achieves ~m-fold prover time speedup vs. Rinocchio with m sub-provers. 在m个子证明者设置下，相比Rinocchio实现约m倍证明时间加速
- • Demonstrated via matrix multiplication, handling ~2^32 constraints beyond prior works. 通过矩阵乘法案例验证实用性，处理~2^32约束，超越现有工作能力
- • Microbenchmarks: 128 sub-provers generate proof in ~9.23 hours, verified in <16 seconds. 微基准测试：128个子证明者可在约9.23小时生成证明，验证仅需16秒
- • Addresses verifiability gap in FHE, reducing reliance on honest-but-curious assumptions. 填补FHE计算可验证性空白，减少对诚实但好奇假设的依赖
Xie et al. proposed Re2creds, an anonymous credential system in their paper, reducing computational costs via reusable presentations and supporting legacy signatures for improved practicality. Xie等人在论文中提出了Re2creds匿名凭证系统，通过可重用演示和证明组合机制，显著降低计算成本并兼容传统签名，提升了实用性和效率。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Re2creds introduces reusable credential presentations, cutting computational costs across sessions. Re2creds引入可重用凭证演示范式，大幅降低多会话计算开销
- • Proof combination moves intensive crypto ops outside circuits, enabling legacy signature support. 通过证明组合机制，将繁重加密操作移出算术电路，支持传统签名
- • Compatible with NIST-recommended curves, removing adoption barriers. 兼容NIST推荐曲线，消除实际应用障碍，提升部署可行性
- • Experimental results show >50% reduction in credential generation time vs. existing schemes. 实验显示凭证生成时间减少超50%，性能优于现有方案
- • BLS signature presentation on BN254 takes <1s, demonstrating high efficiency. 基于BN254的BLS签名演示时间少于1秒，效率显著
- • Security proven via refined UC ideal functionality with rigorous proofs. 通过UC理想功能验证安全性，提供严格证明保障
Jens Groth discusses in a blog how modern ZKPs revisit 20-year-old permutation proof ideas, including switching networks, grand product polynomial identity, and permutation matrices in zkVMs. Jens Groth在博客中讨论了现代ZKP如何重新审视20年前的置换证明思想，包括交换网络、大乘积多项式恒等式和置换矩阵在zkVM中的应用。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Permutation and lookup arguments consume up to half of prover computation in zkVMs, among costliest components. 现代zkVM中的置换和查找参数消耗高达证明者一半计算时间，是成本最高的组件之一。
- • 2025 research (ST25, BCD25, CTHK25) significantly improved prover efficiency. 2025年研究如ST25、BCD25、CTHK25通过新方法显著提升了证明效率。
- • Core ideas: switching networks, grand product polynomial identity, permutation matrices from 20-year-old shuffle proofs. 置换证明的核心思想包括交换网络、大乘积多项式恒等式和置换矩阵，这些在20年前的混洗证明中已有应用。
- • Memory consistency in zkVMs solved via permutation arguments, similar to shuffle proof techniques. zkVM中内存一致性问题可通过置换参数解决，类似混洗证明中的技术。
- • Switching networks for memory consistency may incur logarithmic overhead. 交换网络方法在zkVM中用于内存一致性，但可能导致对数开销。
- • Grand product and permutation matrix methods offer linear or better efficiency improvements. 大乘积多项式恒等式和置换矩阵方法提供了线性或更优的效率改进。
MicrochainLabs open-sourced Microchain ZK Signers, a privacy-preserving multi-signature smart contract wallet protocol using ZK proofs, supporting configurable M-of-N requirements and hiding signer details via state roots. MicrochainLabs开源了Microchain ZK Signers，这是一个基于ZK证明的隐私保护多签智能合约钱包协议，支持可配置的M-of-N签名要求，并通过状态根隐藏签名者信息。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Uses ZK proofs for privacy-preserving multi-signatures, keeping signer set private with only state root public 使用ZK证明实现隐私保护多签，签名者集合完全私有，仅公开状态根
- • Supports configurable M-of-N threshold signatures, e.g., 2-of-3 or 3-of-5 支持可配置的M-of-N阈值签名，如2-of-3或3-of-5
- • Implements ERC-8039 for proof-system agnostic support, compatible with HONK, Groth16, PLONK 协议采用ERC-8039标准，支持多种ZK证明系统如HONK、Groth16、PLONK
- • Includes two Noir circuits: state validation and transaction validation, based on UltraHonk 包含两个Noir电路：状态验证电路和交易验证电路，基于UltraHonk系统
- • Uses salt to prevent brute-force attacks and ensure configuration privacy 通过盐值防止暴力攻击，确保配置隐私
- • Suitable for privacy DAOs, corporate wallets, reducing attack surface 适用于隐私DAO、企业钱包等场景，减少攻击面
Coratger et al. conducted the first rigorous security analysis of the Plonky3 Merkle tree in their paper, proving its position-binding and extractability, ensuring security for ~$4B in assets despite compression function flaws. Coratger等人在论文中首次对Plonky3 Merkle树进行了严格的安全分析，证明了其位置绑定和可提取性，尽管其压缩函数存在安全缺陷，但通过预哈希等对策仍能保障约40亿美元资产的安全。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Widely used Plonky3 Merkle tree secures ~$4B in assets Plonky3 Merkle树因其高效性被广泛部署，通过集成到多个简洁论证系统中，目前保障约40亿美元资产
- • Its underlying 2-to-1 compression function lacks collision-resistance and one-wayness, potentially undermining security 其底层2对1压缩函数不具备抗碰撞性甚至单向性，初看可能危及整个Merkle树安全
- • Common countermeasure is pre-hashing data before use as leaves 常用对策是在使用数据作为叶子节点前进行预哈希处理
- • First rigorous security analysis of this Merkle tree design, showing Plonky3 approach is sound 本研究首次对该Merkle树设计进行严格安全分析，证明Plonky3方法实际上是安全的
- • Demonstrates (strong) position-binding and extractability 具体展示了（强）位置绑定和可提取性特性
- • Enhances confidence in Plonky3 for SNARKs and vector commitments applications 研究结果增强了Plonky3在SNARKs和向量承诺等应用中的可信度
Wang et al. proposed Lether, the first practical account-based private blockchain payment protocol based on post-quantum lattice assumptions, achieving efficient transactions via verifiable refresh mechanisms and optimized ZK proof systems. Wang等人在论文中提出了首个基于后量子格假设的实用账户式私有区块链支付协议Lether，通过可验证刷新机制和优化ZK证明系统实现高效交易。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Enables practical post-quantum private payments using lattices. 首个基于后量子格假设的实用账户式私有区块链支付协议
- • Solves key challenges in lattice-based homomorphic encryption and linkable ring signatures. 解决了格基构造中无界级同态加密和事件导向可链接环签名的核心挑战
- • Uses a lightweight refresh to avoid costly FHE bootstrapping. 引入轻量级刷新机制，避免依赖FHE中的自举或大模数技术
- • Batch-optimized LNP22 ZK proofs; ~68KB per transaction. 优化LNP22 ZK证明系统，单次交易通信成本约68KB
- • Introduces definitions for real-world blockchain privacy. 形式化新定义以更准确捕捉现实区块链环境
- • Proofs generate and verify in under a second on standard PCs. 证明生成和验证在标准PC上仅需不到一秒
Zarinjouei et al. proposed zkRNN in their paper, a ZKP system for RNN inference based on GKR protocol and recursive sum-check, enabling sequence-length-independent verification. Zarinjouei等人在论文中提出zkRNN系统，基于GKR协议和递归sum-check框架，为RNN推理提供ZK证明，实现序列长度无关的验证。
Key Points: 要点：
- • zkRNN addresses ZKP challenges for RNNs due to temporal dependencies and weight sharing zkRNN针对RNN架构设计，解决时序依赖和权重共享的ZK证明挑战
- • Built on GKR protocol and recursive sum-check framework, adapted for RNN structure 基于GKR协议和递归sum-check框架，适应RNN的循环结构
- • Circuit representation encodes hidden-state transitions, unrolls computation across time steps 电路表示编码隐藏状态转换，跨时间步展开计算并共享权重
- • Polylogarithmic verifier time and proof size in final iteration circuit, independent of sequence length 验证器时间和证明大小与最终迭代电路大小呈多对数关系，与序列长度无关
- • Evaluation shows second-scale proving and millisecond-scale verification 评估显示秒级证明生成和毫秒级验证，具有实际应用潜力
- • Enables verifiable inference while preserving model parameter privacy 支持模型输出正确性验证，同时保护模型参数隐私
Kate et al. proposed the first discrete-log-based DKG protocol tailored for blockchains in their paper, leveraging on-chain consensus for improved performance, supporting asynchronous networks and up to 1/2 Byzantine faults. Kate等人在论文中提出了首个基于离散对数的区块链专用DKG协议，利用链上共识机制提升性能，支持异步网络和高达1/2的拜占庭容错。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Existing DKG protocols underutilize blockchain, leaving room for performance improvement. 现有DKG协议未充分利用区块链特性，性能有较大提升空间
- • New protocol tailored for blockchain, leveraging built-in consensus for efficient DKG. 新协议专为区块链设计，利用内置共识机制实现高效DKG
- • Supports asynchronous networks with up to 1/2 Byzantine fault tolerance. 支持异步网络，容错能力高达1/2拜占庭节点
- • Uses random beacon for small committees, reducing communication and computation complexity. 采用随机信标选择小委员会，降低通信和计算复杂度
- • Experiments show faster termination than state-of-the-art protocols with high CPU utilization. 实验显示协议终止速度快于现有方案，CPU资源利用率高
- • Completes in ~6.5 seconds in optimistic case for 256-node systems, suitable for large-scale use. 在256节点系统中，乐观情况下约6.5秒完成，适合大规模应用
Cormode et al. proposed the concept of streaming zero-knowledge proofs in their paper, constructing zero-knowledge SIP protocols for data streams, including core tools like sumcheck and polynomial evaluation. Cormode等人在论文中提出了流式零知识证明的概念，并构建了适用于数据流的零知识SIP协议，包括sumcheck和多项式评估等核心工具。
Key Points: 要点：
- • First to define streaming zero-knowledge proofs, addressing a research gap 首次定义数据流场景下的零知识证明概念
- • Built SIP protocols using sumcheck and polynomial evaluation as core tools 构建了基于sumcheck和多项式评估的零知识SIP协议，这两个是流式交互证明的核心基础工具
- • Handles streaming queries: index, point/range, median, frequency moments, inner product 协议支持索引查询、点查询、范围查询、中位数、频率矩、内积等关键流式计算问题
- • Verifier uses polylog(n) space and efficient communication, ideal for large streams 验证者空间复杂度仅为polylog(n)，适合大数据流场景
- • Introduced algebraic and temporal streaming commitments 开发了代数流式承诺协议和时间承诺等算法工具包，为设计零知识数据流协议提供技术支持
- • Security via reductions from average-case communication and algebraic arguments 通过平均情况通信复杂度的归约和精细的代数与信息论论证确保协议安全性
Chen and Meers proposed generic constructions for non-interactive timed commitments and timed encryption from isogenies in their paper, using efficient building blocks like verifiable random functions for post-quantum security. Chen和Meers在论文中提出了基于同源的非交互定时承诺和定时加密通用构造，使用可验证随机函数等高效组件，实现后量子安全。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Timed commitments are crucial for e-voting and contracts, but most schemes lack post-quantum security or are inefficient. 定时承诺在电子投票、合同签名等场景有广泛应用，但现有方案多依赖非后量子假设或低效组件
- • LEIBNITC and NYTPKE use efficient primitives like verifiable random functions and trapdoor delay functions. 论文提出通用构造LEIBNITC和NYTPKE，仅需可验证随机函数、陷门延迟函数和NIZK等高效组件
- • Isogeny-based designs offer post-quantum security and small commitments (2328 bits). 基于同源实例化实现后量子安全，LEIBNITC承诺大小仅2328比特，是目前最高效的定时承诺之一
- • Avoids reliance on fully homomorphic encryption and other costly components. 解决了传统方案依赖经典假设或全同态加密等低效组件的问题
- • Enables practical post-quantum timed cryptography. 为后量子密码学提供了实用的定时密码学原语
- • Showcases new applications for isogeny cryptography in timed commitments and encryption. 扩展了同源密码学在定时承诺和加密领域的应用
Garg et al. proposed the BABE protocol in their paper, combining witness encryption and efficient garbled circuits to reduce off-chain proof verification costs on Bitcoin by three orders of magnitude while maintaining low on-chain costs. Garg等人在论文中提出BABE协议，通过结合见证加密和高效混淆电路，将比特币上的证明验证链下成本降低三个数量级，同时保持链上低成本。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Bitcoin's limited scripting language and small block space make proof verification challenging 比特币脚本语言表达能力有限且区块空间小，证明验证是长期挑战
- • BitVM2 has high on-chain fees (>$14k in unhappy path), BitVM3 reduces on-chain costs but off-chain storage/setup is huge (42GB garbled circuits) BitVM2链上交易费用极高（不愉快路径超1.4万美元），BitVM3虽降低链上成本但链下存储和设置成本巨大（混淆电路达42GB）
- • BABE uses witness encryption for linear pairings to verify Groth16 proofs, combined with efficient garbled circuits for secure two-party computation BABE使用线性配对关系的见证加密方案验证Groth16证明，结合高效混淆电路实现安全两方计算
- • Design builds on Argo MAC for efficient garbling of homomorphic MACs on elliptic curves 设计基于Argo MAC工作，提供椭圆曲线上同态MAC的高效混淆方案
- • Protocol reduces off-chain costs by three orders of magnitude while maintaining BitVM3's on-chain savings 协议在保持BitVM3链上成本节约的同时，将链下存储和设置成本降低三个数量级
- • Applications include scaling Bitcoin and enabling trustless use of Bitcoin assets in other blockchains 应用包括扩展比特币和实现比特币资产在其他区块链中的无信任使用
Ethereum Foundation discusses zkEVM upgrade security in a blog, focusing on zkVM security, client diversity, and formal verification, with mitigations like multiproofs strategy. Ethereum Foundation在博客中讨论了zkEVM升级的安全问题，重点关注zkVM安全、客户端多样性和形式验证，提出了多证明策略等缓解措施。
Key Points: 要点：
- • zkEVM upgrade introduces provers to execute EVM and generate proofs, reducing verifier hardware and network needs. zkEVM升级引入证明者执行EVM并生成证明，降低验证者硬件和网络需求
- • Security concerns include network composition changes, client and zkVM diversity, and guest program risks. 安全关注点包括网络组成变化、客户端和zkVM多样性、客程序风险
- • Multiproofs strategy requires verifying multiple zkVM+STF combination proofs for enhanced security. 多证明策略要求验证多个zkVM+STF组合证明以增强安全性
- • Formal verification project aims to verify zkSNARK protocols and VM implementations, but not mandatory. 形式验证项目旨在验证zkSNARK协议和虚拟机实现，但非必需
- • zkVMs support limited ISA and syscalls, compiling guest programs may introduce new bugs. zkVM支持有限ISA和系统调用，编译客程序可能引入新bug
- • Teams should avoid unnecessary code changes, enhance testing, and analyze shared failure points. 团队应避免不必要代码更改，加强测试，并分析共享故障点
Eagen and Lai proposed a new garbling primitive, Argo MAC, in their paper, efficiently translating bit decomposition of curve points to homomorphic MACs, enabling over 1000× more efficient garbled SNARK verifiers. Eagen和Lai在论文中提出了一种新的混淆原语Argo MAC，可将曲线点的比特分解编码高效转换为同态MAC，使混淆SNARK验证器效率提升超过1000倍。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Argo MAC is a new garbling primitive for off-chain cryptography like Bitcoin. Argo MAC是一种新的混淆原语，用于优化比特币等链下密码学应用
- • Efficiently translates bit decomposition of curve points to homomorphic MACs. 可将曲线点的比特分解编码高效转换为同态MAC，提升混淆效率
- • Enables construction of garbled SNARK verifiers for pairing-based SNARKs. 支持构建基于配对的SNARK验证器的混淆版本，效率提升显著
- • Integrates with recent work like BitVM to enhance Bitcoin smart contracts. 与BitVM等近期工作结合，扩展比特币智能合约的表达能力
- • Subsequent work will detail garbled SNARK verifier construction. 后续工作将详细描述如何用Argo MAC构建混淆SNARK验证器
- • Facilitates scalable off-chain computation and verification for Bitcoin. 该技术有助于推动比特币链下计算和验证的规模化应用
Devadas et al. revisit building SNARGs for NP using non-signaling PCPs, propose a candidate scheme with security under LWE and a mathematical conjecture, circumventing the Gentry-Wichs black-box barrier. Devadas等人在论文中重新探讨了基于非信号PCP构建NP的SNARGs，提出候选方案并证明其在LWE假设和多项式理想成员证明的数学猜想下的安全性，突破了Gentry-Wichs黑盒障碍。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Exponential-length PCPs circumvent existing barriers for NP SNARGs 使用指数长度PCP可绕过现有障碍，构建NP的SNARGs
- • Propose non-adaptive SNARG candidate with security under LWE 提出非自适应SNARG候选方案，安全性基于LWE等标准假设
- • Introduce mathematical conjecture on polynomial ideals (non-cryptographic) 引入关于实数域上多项式理想的数学猜想（非密码学假设）
- • Non-black-box adversary use breaks Gentry-Wichs black-box barrier 安全性分析非黑盒使用SNARG敌手，突破Gentry-Wichs黑盒障碍
- • Blueprint for NP SNARGs not subject to Gentry-Wichs barrier 为不受Gentry-Wichs障碍限制的NP SNARGs构建提供蓝图
- • Re-evaluate potential of non-signaling PCPs in SNARG construction 重新评估非信号PCP在SNARGs构建中的潜力
Baghery revisits fully secure robust DKG protocols for discrete logarithm in their paper, proposing three more efficient alternatives with O(n) computational complexity and different trade-offs in security, efficiency, and round complexity. Baghery在论文中重新审视了离散对数场景下的完全安全鲁棒DKG协议，提出了三种更高效的替代方案，均实现O(n)计算复杂度，并在安全性、效率和轮数上提供不同权衡。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Traditional GJKR protocol has O(n²) cost, limiting scalability. 传统GJKR协议存在O(n²)计算复杂度问题，影响可扩展性
- • Protocol 1: full security, uniformly random public key. 新协议一保持完全安全，即使面对计算无界对手也能保证公钥均匀随机
- • Protocol 2: better efficiency, indistinguishable public keys. 新协议二在计算效率上更优，公钥分布计算不可区分于均匀分布
- • Protocol 3: 3 rounds, secure variant of Atapoor et al. 新协议三将协议二简化为3轮，是Atapoor等人偏置构造的安全轮数缩减变体
- • New 3-round protocol needs only O(n) exponentiations. 相比近期低轮完全安全DKG协议，新3轮协议仅需O(n)指数运算而非O(n²)
- • Enables flexible security-efficiency trade-offs for DKG. 研究为DKG协议提供了更灵活的安全-效率权衡选择
Gurkan et al. propose OOPS, a one-time oblivious polynomial signature scheme based on pairing-based elliptic curves, supporting secure signatures for up to n messages, with applications in delegatable signatures, 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer, and partially oblivious PRFs. Gurkan等人在论文中提出了一种基于配对椭圆曲线多项式的一次性遗忘多项式签名方案OOPS，支持最多n个消息的安全签名，并展示了其在可委托签名、1-out-of-n遗忘传输和部分遗忘PRF等协议中的应用。
Key Points: 要点：
- • OOPS is built on polynomials over pairing-based elliptic curves, securely signing up to n different messages. OOPS基于配对椭圆曲线多项式构建，可安全签名最多n个不同消息
- • Signing more than n messages allows forgery under given parameters, requiring occasional reparameterization. 签名超过n个消息会导致参数下签名可被伪造，需定期重新参数化
- • Supports delegatable signatures, enhancing signature functionality flexibility. 方案支持构建可委托签名，增强签名功能的灵活性
- • Enables 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer, improving privacy protection. 可用于实现1-out-of-n遗忘传输，提升隐私保护能力
- • Supports partially oblivious PRFs, balancing computational efficiency and privacy needs. 支持部分遗忘PRF，平衡计算效率与隐私需求
- • Demonstrates OOPS's potential in various efficient cryptographic protocols. 展示了OOPS在多种高效密码协议中的实际应用潜力
@0xMiden shared predictions from four privacy experts for 2026, covering trends like private stablecoins, privacy industrialization, practical privacy, and threat-resistant privacy. @0xMiden分享了四位隐私领域专家对2026年隐私发展的预测，包括私有稳定币、隐私工业化、实用性隐私和威胁抵抗隐私等趋势。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Private stablecoins will play a central role in global payments, offering **configurable privacy**. 2026年私有稳定币将成为全球支付基础设施核心层，支持**可配置隐私**如选择性披露和匿名性。
- • Privacy tech is moving to production, but wallet support and compliance remain challenges. 隐私技术将从测试网进入生产阶段，但钱包支持和合规性仍是挑战，规模化需解决这些问题。
- • Privacy involves tradeoffs; **conditional privacy** improves threat resistance. 隐私不是非黑即白，需在特定场景下做出权衡，提供**条件隐私**以增强协议威胁抵抗力。
- • **Threat-resistant privacy** will become standard, with throttled and responsible options. **威胁抵抗隐私**将成为默认标准，包括限制性隐私和负责任隐私两类解决方案。
- • Enterprises need confidentiality; retail users oppose fully transparent payments. 企业需要隐私保护敏感商业关系，而零售用户拒绝完全透明的支付轨道。
- • Privacy systems will add policy controls for compliance while preserving core privacy. 隐私系统将整合政策控制，在合规的同时不牺牲基础隐私，重新定义链上合规支付。
Fiore et al. proposed a SNARK scheme for (non-)subsequence relations in their paper, achieving text-sub-linear proving time via preprocessing and cached quotients. Fiore等人在论文中提出了一种用于（非）子序列关系的SNARK方案，通过预处理和缓存商技术，将证明时间优化至文本次线性级别。
Key Points: 要点：
- • SNARK for verifying (non-)subsequence between strings. 提出一种SNARK方案，用于验证字符串是否为文本的子序列或非子序列
- • Has preprocessing and proof phases; assumes short subsequence. 方案分为预处理阶段和（非）子序列证明阶段，假设子序列长度远小于文本长度
- • Preprocessing uses only text and alphabet, no need for subsequence. 预处理仅依赖文本和字母表，可提前计算，无需知道子序列
- • Employs cached quotients for quasilinear preprocessing. 采用缓存商技术，预处理运行时间拟线性于文本长度加字母表大小
- • Proof time is logarithmic in subsequence length. 证明（非）子序列的运行时间为子序列长度的对数级别，实现文本次线性证明时间
- • Useful for genomics, blockchains, NLP, etc. 应用场景包括基因分析、区块链、自然语言处理等领域
Nethermind, L2BEAT, and Etherealize jointly published a report analyzing how Ethereum Layer 2 networks are evolving into core infrastructure for institutional finance, covering scalability, security, compliance, and ZK proof applications. Nethermind联合L2BEAT和Etherealize发布报告，分析以太坊Layer 2网络如何成为机构金融核心基础设施，涵盖可扩展性、安全性、合规性及ZK证明应用。
Key Points: 要点：
- • Institutions like JPMorgan and BlackRock are using Ethereum Layer 2 for payments and tokenized assets. 机构正从试点转向生产系统，如摩根大通、贝莱德等使用以太坊基础设施进行支付和资产代币化。
- • L2s leverage ZK proofs for privacy, scalability, and compliance. Layer 2网络通过ZK证明提供隐私和可扩展性，支持自定义执行环境和合规框架。
- • Rollups inherit Ethereum security and data availability. Rollup（Op和ZK）提供最高安全性，继承以太坊验证和数据可用性，适合高价值工作流。
- • Both public and private L2s settle on Ethereum, ensuring interoperability. 公共和私有Layer 2模型支持不同操作需求，均锚定以太坊结算，保持互操作性。
- • Compliance benefits from onchain identity and ZK proofs. 合规性通过链上身份、基于规则的传输和ZK证明得到加强，减少对链下流程的依赖。
- • Examples: JPMorgan testing deposit tokens on Base; Visa piloting ZK proof payments. 案例研究包括摩根大通在Base测试存款代币、Visa实验ZK证明用于私有代币化支付。
Debrup Chatterjee proposed SumSig, a code-based digital signature scheme leveraging sum-check protocols to reduce repetition reliance, achieving negligible error via single extension field verification, with signatures ~5-8KB. Debrup Chatterjee在论文中提出了SumSig，一种基于编码的数字签名方案，利用Sum-Check协议减少对重复的依赖，通过单次扩展域验证实现可忽略的误差，签名约5-8KB。
Key Points: 要点：
- • SumSig uses sum-check protocols to replace repetitive Σ-protocols, reducing signature generation reliance. SumSig利用Sum-Check协议替代重复Σ协议，减少签名生成依赖
- • Achieves negligible error via single extension field verification without repetition. 通过扩展域单次验证实现可忽略的误差，无需重复操作
- • Signature size ~5-8KB, public key 50-100KB, offering different trade-offs. 签名大小约5-8KB，公钥50-100KB，提供不同权衡
- • Based on Syndrome Decoding problem with quasi-tight reduction in random oracle model. 基于Syndrome Decoding问题，在随机预言模型中有准紧规约
- • Provides new choice in signature/public key size compared to Wave and LESS. 相比Wave和LESS等方案，在签名和公钥大小间提供新选择
- • First public version; feedback welcome, focusing on post-quantum cryptography. 这是首次公开版本，欢迎反馈，关注后量子密码学进展
Abhinav Vishnu proposed the PTX protocol in paper, using zkSNARK for asynchronous, non-interactive domain control validation without active servers, anchored via DNS TXT records. Abhinav Vishnu在论文中提出了PTX协议，利用zkSNARK实现异步、非交互式域控制验证，无需活动服务器，通过DNS TXT记录锚定证明。
Key Points: 要点：
- • PTX protocol uses zkSNARK for asynchronous, non-interactive domain control validation, replacing traditional ACME PTX协议利用zkSNARK实现异步、非交互式域控制验证，替代传统ACME协议
- • Anchors proofs via DNS TXT records, eliminating need for active web servers or open ports 通过DNS TXT记录锚定证明，无需活动Web服务器或开放网络端口
- • Circuit design binds ephemeral secrets to scoped metadata, enabling client-side verification and privacy 电路设计将临时秘密绑定到范围元数据，支持客户端验证和隐私保护
- • Implemented with Groth16 and Poseidon, only 1,756 constraints, verification under 15ms 使用Groth16和Poseidon实现，仅1,756约束，验证时间低于15ms
- • Mitigates replay attacks, suitable for serverless, static, and air-gapped deployments 有效缓解重放攻击，适用于无服务器、静态和隔离部署环境
- • Provides privacy-preserving alternative for identity assertions in decentralized environments 为去中心化环境中的身份断言提供隐私保护替代方案