Fenzi and Sanso analyzed the security of small-field hash-based SNARGs, proposing a general attack method, indicating that their actual security is lower than expected, affecting existing deployment systems. Fenzi和Sanso在论文中分析了小域哈希SNARG的安全性,提出通用攻击方法,指出其实际安全性低于预期,影响现有部署系统。
Notes
The security of small-field hash-based SNARGs relies on the combination of proximity error and list size parameters of linear codes.
Existing deployment systems operate under capacity mechanism, but security may be overestimated.
The research proposes a general attack method, and the success probability depends on the list size parameter.
Analysis of extension codes in small fields shows that combining lower bounds leads to strong attacks.
This challenges the optimistic assumption of the near-gap conjecture, affecting actual deployment systems.
The research provides important references for Ethereum Proximity Prize and security evaluation.